Abstract-At present, adversarial attacks are designed in a task-specific fashion. However, for downstream computer vision tasks such as image captioning, image segmentation etc., the current deep learning systems use an image classifier like VGG16, ResNet50, Inception-v3 etc. as a feature extractor. Keeping this in mind, we propose Mimic and Fool, a task agnostic adversarial attack. Given a feature extractor, the proposed attack finds an adversarial image which can mimic the image feature of the original image. This ensures that the two images give the same (or similar) output regardless of the task. We randomly select 1000 MSCOCO validation images for experimentation. We perform experiments on two image captioning models, Show and Tell, Show Attend and Tell and one VQA model, namely, end-to-end neural module network (N2NMN). The proposed attack achieves success rate of 74.0%, 81.0% and 89.6% for Show and Tell, Show Attend and Tell and N2NMN respectively. We also propose a slight modification to our attack to generate natural-looking adversarial images. In addition, it is shown that the proposed attack also works for invertible architecture. Since Mimic and Fool only requires information about the feature extractor of the model, it can be considered as a gray-box attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Adversarial attacks have shed light on the vulnerability of several state-of-the-art deep learning systems across varied tasks such as image classification, object detection, image segmentation etc. [1] - [4] . Recently, adversarial attacks were also proposed for multimodal tasks involving vision and language like image captioning and visual question answering (VQA) [5] , [6] . Usually, these attacks fall under two categories: whitebox and black-box. In white-box attack, the adversary has complete information about the model and its parameters. Whereas in black-box attack, the adversary has no information about the model that it wants to attack. Black-box attacks [7] are possible due to the transferability phenomenon of adversarial examples. Liu et al. [8] show that the adversarial examples designed for one image classification model can be transferred successfully to other classification models as well. Similarly, Xu et al. [6] show transferability of adversarial images between two state-of-the-art VQA models. However, the present-day adversarial attacks are task-specific in nature since a task-specific adversarial loss function is optimized to generate adversarial examples.
On the other hand, the current deep learning systems use output from intermediate layers of convolutional neural network (CNN) based image classification models (e.g. ResNet50 [9], VGG16 [10] , Inception-v3 [11] etc.) as a feature for the input image. The rationale behind this approach is that the discriminative features learned by these classifiers are useful for other vision tasks as well. Hence, it is more beneficial to use these features instead of learning them from scratch. As a result, the aforementioned image classifiers function as feature extractors. Some deep learning systems also finetune the parameters of the feature extractors during training to make the image feature more suitable for the task in hand. However, fine-tuning is usually done if large amount of training data is available. Although using deep CNN-based image features give significant advantage to the present-day models, they have their own set of drawbacks. CNN-based feature extractors are known to be non-invertible [12] , [13] . Mahendran and Vedaldi [13] show that AlexNet [14] maps multiple images to the same 1000-dimensional logits. These images are thus indistinguishable from the viewpoint of the last fully connected layer of AlexNet.
In this paper, we propose Mimic and Fool, a task agnostic adversarial attack, which exploits the non-invertibility of CNN-based feature extractors to attack the downstream model. Given a model and its feature extractor, the proposed attack is based on the simple hypothesis that if two images are indistinguishable for the feature extractor then they will be indistinguishable for the model as well. In other words, attacking the feature extractor by finding two indistinguishable images is equivalent to hacking the eyes of the model. As an example, consider an encoder-decoder architecture like Show and Tell [15] , if we can successfully find two images which are mapped to the same feature by the encoder, then the two images will generate same (or similar) caption regardless of the decoder architecture. Thus to attack any model, attacking its feature extractor suffices. Based on this insight, Mimic and Fool finds an adversarial image which can mimic the feature of the original image thereby fooling the model. Figure 1 shows examples of Mimic and Fool on two captioning models: Show and Tell [15] , Show Attend and Tell [16] and one VQA model: end-to-end neural module network (N2NMN) [17] .
Since Mimic and Fool only requires the fine-tuned weights of the feature extractor to attack the model, it can be thought of as a gray-box attack. In fact, if a model does not finetune its feature extractor, Mimic and Fool can function as a black-box attack. This is because the number of possible feature extractors is limited. Hence, an adversary can generate an adversarial image per feature extractor knowing that one of these images is bound to fool the model. Furthermore, Mimic and Fool is extremely fast and requires less computing resources since only the feature extractor needs to be loaded in the memory instead of the model.
We perform experiments on two tasks: image captioning and visual question answering (VQA). We randomly choose 1000 MSCOCO [18] validation images and study the proposed attack on three models: Show and Tell, Show Attend and Tell, and N2NMN. We get 5208 image-question pairs from VQA v2.0 dataset [19] for the 1000 selected images. We choose these three models since they use different feature extractors. Show and Tell uses fully connected features from Inception-v3, Show Attend and Tell uses convolutional layer features from VGG16 and N2NMN uses features from a residual network [9] . Thus the three feature extractors vary from shallow to very deep helping us to validate our proposed attack for different types of feature extractors. We consider our attack successful if the model gives the same output for original and adversarial image.
A. Contributions of this work
The contributions of this paper are as follows: (i) We introduce the notion of a task agnostic attack. The proposed task agnostic attack, Mimic and Fool, achieves success rate of 74.0%, 81.0% and 89.6% for Show and Tell, Show Attend and Tell, N2NMN respectively. The high success rate for the three models validates our hypothesis that attacking the feature extractor suffices and also shows that the proposed attack works for different feature extractors. For image captioning models, we also compute the BLEU [20] and METEOR [21] score for the failure cases to show that even though the original and adversarial captions do not match exactly for these cases, they are very similar to each other. (ii) We also propose a modified version of our attack to generate natural-looking adversarial images. In the modified version, we start with a fixed natural image and restrict the amount of noise that can be added to the image. We use the same starting image for both the captioning models. Even in this restricted setting, the proposed attack achieves decent success rate. This shows that, by adding imperceptible noise to the fixed image, it is possible to find an adversarial image which can mimic image feature of any arbitrary image. This result is intriguing as it suggests that the feature extractors are very chaotic in nature.
(iii) Since Mimic and Fool is task agnostic, while attacking a VQA model like N2NMN we need to run the attack for every image instead of every image-question pair. This is a huge advantage in terms of time saved for the adversary. The same will hold true for any future tasks which take multiple modalities as input with image being one of the modalities. (iv) At first glance, it seems that an invertible feature extractor will be resistant to the proposed attack. However, we show that the proposed attack also works for invertible architecture [22] . This shows that such architectures, despite being invertible, assign similar features to dissimilar images. Hence, invertibility is not a sufficient condition to safeguard the models against the proposed attack.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we explain the proposed attack in detail and then we specify the training details and the hyperparameters used for the present work. In Section III, we analyze the results of Mimic and Fool on the three models. We also analyze the results of the proposed variant of Mimic and Fool on the two captioning models; Show and Tell and Show Attend and Tell. Furthermore, we study the proposed variant on an invertible architecture. Finally in Section IV, we give conclusions and related future work.
II. METHOD

A. Proposed Attack
In this section, we describe the proposed attack, Mimic and Fool, and One Image Many Outputs (OIMO) which is able to generate natural looking adversarial images. Since both the attacks are task agnostic, we describe the attack in terms of the feature extractor instead of the model. 
where . 2 denotes 2 −norm and trunc is truncating function which ensures that the intensity values lie in the range [0, 255]. Although I = I org is a solution to the above optimization problem, it is highly unlikely that the algorithm will converge to this solution. This is because convolutional neural networks discard significant amount of spatial information as we go from lower to higher layers. Mahendran and Vedaldi [13] show that the amount of invariance increases from lower to higher layer of AlexNet and regularizers like total variation (TV) are needed to reconstruct the original image from higher layer features of AlexNet. We start with a zero-image and run the proposed attack for max iter iterations and return the final truncated image trunc(I) as I adv .
Some feature extractors such as Inception-v3 require the intensity values of the input image to be in the range
m×n×3 be the scaled original image i.e.
For this case, we modify the optimization problem defined in Equation 1 as follows
where tanh ensures that the input to feature extractor lies within the required range. We run the attack for max iter iterations and rescale the final image tanh(I) to get I adv i.e.
2) One Image Many Outputs: In One Image Many Outputs (OIMO), we start with an image I start ∈ [0, 255] m×n×3 instead of starting with zero-image. The image I start is kept fixed throughout the experiment. In OIMO, our goal is to modify I start so as to mimic the feature of I org . Equation 1 is modified as follows
Similar to Chen et al. [5] , we modify the Equation 3 as follows
where
is the scaled starting image, λ is set to 0.9999 to ensure invertibility of tanh, δ ∈ R m×n×3 is the learnable parameter.
For this attack, we reduce the value of max iter and initial learning rate to ensure that I adv looks very similar to I start . Similar to Mimic and Fool, after running the attack for max iter iterations, I adv for Equation 5 is trunc(I start + δ). For Equation 6 , I adv is given by the following equation
We name the proposed attack One Image Many Outputs since all the adversarial images look very similar to I start .
B. Implementation Details
As stated earlier, we study the proposed attack for two image captioning models; Show and Tell, Show Attend and Tell and one VQA model, namely, N2NMN. We train the N2NMN model on VQA v2.0 dataset for 95K iterations with expert policy followed by 65K iterations in policy search after cloning stage using the original source code 1 For Mimic and Fool, we set max iter to 1000, 1000 and 2000 for Inception-v3, VGG16 and ResNet-152 respectively. The initial learning rate is set to 0.025, 0.025 and 0.0125 for Inception-v3, VGG16 and ResNet-152 respectively. For One Image Many Outputs, we set max iter to 300, 500 and set the initial learning rate to 0.0125 for Inception-v3 and VGG16. We use Adam [23] as the optimizer and Keras [24] for implementing the proposed attacks. All experiments are done on a single 11 GB GeForce GTX 1080 Ti GPU.
III. RESULTS
For studying the two proposed attacks, 1000 MSCOCO validation images are randomly selected. For the 1000 selected images, there are 5208 image-question pairs in VQA v2.0 dataset. The proposed attack is considered to be successful if the model gives the same output for the original and the adversarial image. Hence for image captioning, the two captions need to be exactly the same for the attack to be successful. In the following subsections, we analyze the behavior of the two proposed attacks on the three models: N2NMN, Show and Tell and Show Attend and Tell. Table I shows the success rate of Mimic and Fool for the three models. For N2NMN, out of 5208 image question pairs, Mimic and Fool is successful for 4665 image question pairs. This yields success rate of 89.6%. The high success rate shows that it is possible to mimic features extracted from a very deep network like ResNet-152 as well. Since Mimic and Fool is task-agnostic, we need to run the proposed attack at image level instead of image-question pair level. Hence, we only need to run the attack 1000 times instead of 5208 times. This is a huge advantage since it results in a drastic reduction in time. The advantage will be even more pronounced for any future tasks which have multiple modalities as input with image (or video) being one of the modalities. Figure 2 shows the predicted answer by N2NMN for different image-question pairs. From Figure 2 , we can see that a single adversarial image suffices for three image-question pairs. As we can see from Table I , Mimic and Fool is very fast. The attack only takes around 25 seconds for generating adversarial images for Show and Tell. The time taken for Show, Attend and Tell is even less since VGG16 is a shallower network. The proposed attack achieves success rate of 74.0% and 81.0% for Show and Tell and Show Attend and Tell respectively. This is especially encouraging result since generating exactly the same caption for an adversarial image is a very challenging task. This is because, as observed by Chen et al. [5] , the number of possible captions are infinite which makes a captioning system harder to attack than an image classifier. Our results show that in order to generate the same caption, it suffices to attack just the encoder of the captioning model. This validates our initial hypothesis that in order to attack any model, attacking its feature extractor suffices. For the unsuccessful cases, the predicted captions for original and adversarial images are very similar. Figure 4 shows two successful and one unsuccessful examples of Mimic and Fool for Show and Tell and Show Attend and Tell. As we can see from Figure 4 that for the unsuccessful cases, the predicted captions for the original and adversarial images have a large amount of overlap. We also calculate the BLEU and METEOR score, using the pipeline provided by Sharma et al. [25] , for unsuccessful adversarial cases as shown in Table II . We use the predicted caption for the original image as reference while calculating these metrics.
B. Results for One Image Many Outputs
The main idea behind One Image Many Outputs is to generate natural-looking adversarial images. We randomly choose an image from MSCOCO training set as the starting image. Figure 3 shows the starting image (I start ) for One Image Many Outputs along with the predicted captions of Show And Tell and Show Attend and Tell. In One Image Many Outputs, we reduce the value of max iter and the initial learning rate to ensure that the adversarial image I adv looks very similar to I start . Reduction in max iter results in even faster running time than Mimic and Fool. For both the captioning models, One Image Many Outputs takes under 10 seconds per image. Table III shows the success rate of One Image Many Outputs for Show and Tell and Show Attend and Tell. As we can see from Table I and Table III , the success rate reduces for One Image Many Outputs in comparison to Mimic and Fool. This is intuitive since in One Image Many Outputs, the reduced value of max iter and initial learning rate allows for less adversarial noise.
Considering this reduction and the fact that the attack is successful only when there is an exact match of captions, the success rate of One Image Many Outputs is impressive. Similar to Mimic and Fool, we find that for the unsuccessful cases of One Image Many Outputs, the captions predicted by the model for the adversarial and original images are very similar to each other. Table II shows the BLEU and METEOR score for the unsuccessful cases of One Image Many Outputs. This result shows that even when I adv is very similar to I start , it can mimic features of an arbitrary image. This shows that CNN- Figure 5 , the captions within brackets are the predicted captions by the other captioning model i.e. the captioning model which is not under attack. As we can see from Figure 5 , all the six adversarial images are very similar to the starting image, I start . Also for the unsuccessful cases, the original and adversarial captions have a large amount of overlap and are semantically similar.
In Figure 5 , we see that for Show and Tell, the captions within brackets, i.e. the captions predicted by Show Attend and Tell, for the three adversarial images are the same. Similarly for Show Attend and Tell, although the captions within the brackets (captions predicted by Show and Tell) are different, they are semantically similar. Moreover, for both the captioning models, all the captions within brackets are relevant captions for the starting image, I start . In fact, we find that when the 1000 adversarial images for Show And Tell are given as input to Show Attend and Tell, there are only 15 unique captions. All these 15 captions are relevant captions for I start . Similarly, when the 1000 adversarial images for Show Attend and Tell are given as input to Show and Tell, there are only 82 unique captions, most of which are relevant to I start . We find that Show and Tell generates irrelevant captions for I start only for 32 out of 1000 adversarial images. Since the two captioning models use different feature extractors, this result shows that the proposed attack is very dependent on the feature extractor. In other words, ensuring that the two images are indistinguishable for one feature extractor does not ensure that they will be indistinguishable for another feature extractor. More examples of the two proposed attacks can be seen at https://www.isical.ac.in/ ∼ utpal/resources.php.
C. Comparison with task specific attack
In this section, we compare our proposed attack, OIMO, with a white-box attack for Show and Tell, namely Show-andFool [5] . Similar to OIMO, we start with I start and run the attack, using the official implementation 4 Chen et al. [5] study the transferability of Show-and-Fool between the captioning models, however in their study, the two captioning models use the same feature extractor.
D. OIMO for invertible architecture
Recently, Jacobsen et al. [22] propose a deep invertible architecture, i-RevNet which learns a one-to-one mapping between image and its feature. These networks achieve impressive accuracy on ILSVRC-2012 [26] . For experimentation, we choose bijective i-RevNet which takes images of size 224 × 224 × 3 as input and the corresponding feature is of size 3072 × 7 × 7. We use the pretrained i-RevNet provided in the official implementation 5 to test our proposed attack, One Image Many Outputs. We randomly choose 100 correctly classified images belonging to 41 different classes from the validation set of ILSVRC-2012. Furthermore, we choose a starting image, I start , belonging to a different class. We also restrict the search space for adversarial images using the clipping function Clip Istart, (i.e.
∞ -neighborhood of I start ). Starting with I start ∈ [0, 255] 224×224×3 , we run the proposed attack, OIMO, in order to mimic the feature for 100 images. Table IV shows the success rate for different values of . The high success rate shows that the proposed attack can be applied for invertible architecture like i-RevNet as well. This is because i-RevNet, despite being invertible, assigns similar features to dissimilar images. Figure 6 shows one such successful adversarial example. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a task agnostic adversarial attack, Mimic and Fool. The proposed attack exploits the noninvertibility of CNN-based feature extractors and is based on the hypothesis that if two images are indistinguishable for the feature extractor then they will be indistinguishable for the model as well. The high success rate of Mimic and Fool for three models across two tasks validates this hypothesis. Since the three models use feature extractors varying from shallow to very deep, the high success rate also shows that the proposed attack works regardless of the depth of the feature extractor. Also due to the task-agnostic nature, we need to run the attack only at image-level which is a huge advantage in terms of time saved for tasks involving multiple modalities as input. We further propose a variant of Mimic and Fool, named One Image Many Outputs, which generates naturallooking adversarial images. The results for this variant of the attack show that it is possible to mimic features of an arbitrary image by making imperceptible changes to a fixed image as well. This is an important insight into the nature of CNN-based feature extractors. We also demonstrate the applicability of the proposed attack for invertible architectures like iRevNet.
In the present version of Mimic and Fool, the adversary needs information about the feature extractor of the model and also needs access to the fine-tuned weights of the feature extractor. We found that using pretrained instead of fine-tuned weights leads to drop in success rate of the proposed attack. This makes the proposed attack a gray-box attack. As part of future work, one can explore different attack strategies which will work successfully with just the pretrained weights.
